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TRADABLE PERMITS – A
MARKET-BASED ALLOCATION
SYSTEM FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
A. DENNY ELLERMAN*
E
nvironmental concerns are as old as Man, but
tradable permits are a relatively recent innova-
tion in dealing with these problems. Barely forty
years have passed since the basic idea underlying
tradable permits was stated by Coase (1960), who
noted the reciprocal nature of harmful effects and
suggested that their regulation might be accom-
plished as effectively and efficiently by a market as
by the more conventional forms of regulation.
Another decade would elapse before this insight was
elaborated and applied specifically to environmental
problems (Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; Montgomery,
1972). For another two decades, economists promot-
ed tradable permits as a policy alternative, but the
concept was generally regarded as impractical
despite its theoretically attractive properties.Only in
the last decade have tradable permits been imple-
mented and declared a success, mostly in the United
States, where they are still the exception, but also
increasingly in Europe. An obvious question is
whether the current enthusiasm for tradable permits
reflects a passing fad or a more enduring trend.This
article seeks to provide a perspective that will enable
readers to answer that question.
What is a tradable permit?
In its most general use, a tradable permit can be
defined as a transferable right to a common pool
resource. A common application is individual trad-
able quotas (ITQs) for fishing rights, which are grant-
ed in quantities to preserve the fishing stock and to
avoid over-exploitation. In environmental applica-
tions, the common pool resource is air or water that
does not contain concentrations of substances that
harm human health or that degrade air or water qual-
ity in some manner. A narrower and more specific
definition for environmental applications is then: a
transferable right to emit a substance that can create
pollution. Implicit in this definition, and in the con-
cept of tradable permits, is the notion that some level
of emissions does not create pollution, just as some
level of fishing does not constitute over-fishing.
The permits that implement command-and-control
regulations, what I will call conventional environ-
mental permits, are a type of operating permit that
specifies conditions concerning discharges that must
be met for a particular facility to operate, or for a
vehicle to be sold and operated.These permits typi-
cally cover a variety of emissions and they may set
standards for each, perhaps limiting emissions to
some relatively low rate per unit of input or output,
or prescribing certain technologies or practices,
which will have the same effect.They are attached to
the facility or vehicle; they aim at controlling sub-
stances that can contribute to pollution; and they
implicitly grant rights to emit the substance so long
as permit conditions are met.Tradable permits differ
from these conventional permits chiefly in focusing
on a single discharge and being transferable.
Transferability implies that the potentially polluting
discharge can be identified and separated,or unbun-
dled, from the underlying environmental permit.As
such, transferability imposes specific requirements
on tradable permit systems that are not necessarily
required for conventional environmental regulation.
Types of tradable permits
Tradable permits can be classified into three dis-
tinct forms – credit trading, averaging, and allow-
ance trading – and distinguished by their relation
to a conventional environmental permit.1
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1 This typology is used and explained in greater detail with exam-
ples in Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison (2003).Credit Trading is the form closest to the conven-
tional permit. A facility that does more than
required to meet the conditions of its permit may
get credit for its extra effort and that credit can be
transferred to another facility that is thereby
excused from fulfilling the condition of its permit
in like amount.As the name implies, credit trading
awards exemplary behavior and allows compensat-
ing regulatory relaxations of a common require-
ment.A distinctive feature of credit trading is cer-
tification,the process by which the regulator deter-
mines that credit-worthy activity has occurred and
that the credit can be transferred. Certification has
been a problem in that the regulator usually seeks
to ensure that a facility will not receive credit for
what it would have done “anyway,” since granting
credit in this case would lead to higher emissions
by the firm to whom the credit is transferred. The
transaction costs associated with certification have
been high and have often overwhelmed the cost
savings from the proposed trades.As a result, even
when credit trading has been made a feature of
environmental regulation, few trades have been
observed. As noted by Shabman, Stevenson, and
Shobe (2002), credit trading is an extension of con-
ventional command-and-control regulation that
keeps firm-level abatement decisions in the hands
of the regulator.
Averaging constitutes a further step away from the
underlying environmental permit in dispensing with
certification. It can be seen as automatic credit trad-
ing in which parties that do better than required in
their permits automatically receive credits that can
be used by others without any question from the reg-
ulator whether the firm generating the credit would
have reduced emissions anyway. The pre-existing
standard about which emissions are traded is still in
place,but in dispensing with certification,the regula-
tor no longer attempts to make the abatement deci-
sion at the level of the firm.The common standard or
technology is simply a reference point or benchmark
about which differences are traded. Although aver-
aging is a more precise term to describe what actual-
ly occurs, European terminology tends toward vari-
ous formulations containing the term “relative,”
which imply trading around a limit relative to input
or output instead of under an absolute cap as in an
allowance system.
Allowance Trading is also known as cap-and-trade,
so called because of the absolute cap on emissions
and the ability to trade emissions under the cap.
Although a logical progression from credit trading
and averaging, allowance trading is in several ways
a radical departure. For one thing, the compliance
requirement is entirely different. Instead of deter-
mining compliance by reference to a common stan-
dard and sanctioned or compensated deviations
from it, firms are required to surrender a permit
for every unit of discharge. Although the cap may
be very constraining in the aggregate, no firm is
expected to meet any specific standard. It must
only obtain and surrender an allowance that can be
readily bought or sold in the market. In effect,
allowances have become essential inputs into pro-
duction subject to the same marginal cost calcula-
tions as other inputs.
Two consequences flow from the allowance trading
form of tradable permit. First, the regulator’s task
is not to specify an emissions standard, but a cap.
This requires initial decisions concerning 1) an
acceptable or optimal quantity of emissions and
2) the limits to trading, both spatially and tempo-
rally. Second, the rights to discharge are now
explicit and must be allocated in some manner
instead of being implicit and granted without ques-
tion to the owners of the emitting facility.
These three forms of tradable permits can be seen
as a progression from a centralized system in which
abatement decisions throughout the economy are
the sole province of the regulator to a more decen-
tralized, “property rights” system in which firms
take over the abatement decisions subject to the
constraints of the cap and its spatial and temporal
dimensions, which only the regulator can (and
should) decide.
Requirements for an effective system
As the most evolved form of a tradable permit sys-
tem, allowance trading has prerequisites that differ
in important aspects from what conventional com-
mand-and-control systems require. Some of the
requirements of allowance trading are shared by
averaging and credit trading systems, but not all or
to the same extent.These prerequisites follow log-
ically from the transferability of tradable permits
and from the nature of allowances and the cap in
allowance trading systems.
Measuring emissions is perhaps the most radical
requirement of tradable permits for many, if not
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most, environmental programs do not determine
compliance by the actual measurement of emis-
sions.Compliance consists of installing and operat-
ing certain equipment, engaging in certain prac-
tices, or limiting certain inputs, all of which will
reduce emissions, if enforced and implemented
continuously. In contrast, tradable permit systems
require measurement and continuous monitoring
of the regulated emissions; otherwise there is no
way to determine compliance or to define what is
to be traded.2 Although obvious, measurement is
not always feasible and the growth in tradable per-
mits is in part the result of changes in the ability to
monitor, and the cost of doing so, that are associat-
ed with the late 20th century changes in informa-
tion, control and sensing technology (Kruger,
McLean, and Chen; 2000).
Allocating emission rights is a prerequisite of
allowance trading only, although rights to emit are
implicit in both credit trading and averaging, as
they are in conventional environmental permits.
Deciding who is entitled to receive these allow-
ances is a matter of some consequence and great
controversy.3 Allocation involves a two-level deci-
sion, first, whether to auction the permits or grant
them gratis to various entities,and then how to dis-
tribute the auction revenues or permits, as the case
may be. Claimants for this rent have not been
wanting and a considerable literature has devel-
oped on the optimal use of the scarcity rent creat-
ed by the cap.4 The pros and cons of various meth-
ods of allocation is well beyond the scope of this
paper, but the fight over prospective rents – which
combines unadorned rent-seeking with high princi-
ples of equity and efficiency – can be both an
obstacle and a means of gaining consensus, as evi-
denced most recently in the negotiations surround-
ing the proposed EU Emissions Trading Directive
(Council of the European Union, 2002). This con-
troversy is largely avoided in credit trading and
averaging because, ironically, the implicit assign-
ment of the rent to the incumbent in the underly-
ing command-and-control system of regulation is
not raised and never challenged.
Defining pollution. All environmental regulatory
systems presume some definition of pollution, but
none are required to define it as specifically as cap-
and-trade systems. Not only must the potentially
polluting discharge be separately identified, but at
least in theory the amount constituting pollution
must be determined, as well as the spatial and tem-
poral relation of discharges to the harmful effects.
This requirement is faced by all environmental reg-
ulation, but the connection between emissions and
the problem justifying the emission constraint is
usually less direct. For instance, technology stan-
dards are prescribed not because they fit the prob-
lem but because they usually represent the “best”
that can be done at the present, and that will con-
tribute to the problem’s solution, at the least, and
perhaps eliminate it. While in theory the cap
should be the level that will avoid harmful effects,
an increasingly frequent solution is that the cap is
set at a level that would be achieved if some “best”
technology were to be required of all, or, especial-
ly in the case of greenhouse gas controls, at a level
that is presumed to be a step in the direction of
reducing emissions to some ultimate goal.
Why tradable permits?
A fair question today in response to the attention
being given tradable permits is: Why? Or alterna-
tively: Why not taxes or conventional regulatory
measures? 
By far the more common policy instrument for
achieving environmental goals is what has come to
called command-and-control regulation, namely,
the mandating of specific technology or other
emission standards that are presumed applicable
to all sources. The reasons for relying on conven-
tional regulatory measures heretofore are easy to
enumerate. Both taxes and tradable permits
require emissions to be measured so that, if mea-
surement is not feasible or it is costly, the only
alternative is to prescribe the appropriate abate-
ment technology or set of practices and to set up
the enforcement regime that will lead to accept-
ably continuous application.Then,in the early days
of modern environmental regulation, the sources
of pollution were easily identifiable in being most-
ly large and stationary,which made it easier to pre-
2 Credit trading could occur without measurement since the cred-
itable reduction and the transfer depend entirely on regulatory
determination. For instance, a regulator might allow a firm to meet
a less stringent standard at one facility if it installs technology that
is expected to reduce emissions more than required at another
facility, without actually measuring emissions at either facility.
3When trading is allowed,the receipt of the right is distinct from its
exercise. If allowances are freely granted, or “grandfathered,” to
incumbents, the recipient and the user are often the same, but the
two functions remain distinct. In deciding to use a grandfathered
allowance, the recipient-user is incurring an opportunity cost and
effectively paying himself as rentier for the use of the permit.Were
he not to use the permit, he could sell the permit and collect the
rent as income.
4 See, for instance, Harrison (1996), Goulder et al. (1999), and
Dinan and Rogers (2002).scribe appropriate abatement. Also, when faith in
the capability of expert government agencies was
greater than it is now, there seemed less reason to
question this approach.
Those circumstances are increasingly less applica-
ble on both sides of the Atlantic. The ability to
measure emissions at relatively low cost has been
greatly reduced by improvements in sensing and
information technology. The big, initial pollution
problems have been satisfactorily addressed, and
the problems now facing modern post-industrial
societies are far more complex and less obvious.
Finally, experience and the rise of public choice lit-
erature has diminished confidence in the efficiency
and equity of direct government intervention and
led to a search for more effective, efficient and
equitable approaches.
As market-based instruments, environmental taxes
have the same efficiency attributes of tradable per-
mits in leaving abatement decisions to firms, but
they have been regarded as non-starters in the
United States, and although more used in Europe,
taxes are far from being the prevalent mode of
environmental regulation. The reason for the
apparent preference for tradable permits instead
of taxes probably resides in the domain of political
economy. For one thing, taxes appropriate to the
state the scarcity rent that is embodied in tradable
permits.5 Moreover, the usual alternative to trad-
able permits is not an environmental tax but some
form of conventional environmental regulation,
which has the merit – from the standpoint of
incumbents – of unobtrusively endowing them with
the entitlement to the scarcity rent.The title is not
as secure and it is not separable from the facility
for which the environmental permit applies, but
better an encumbered entitlement than none at all,
or one that has to be bought. From this standpoint,
tradable permits are worth considering, perhaps
not so much because of their efficiency properties,
but because they offer the possibility of un-
bundling the right from the facility and monetizing
it directly.6 If incumbent emitters had no voice in
societal decisions, the choice of instrument would
not be a matter of concern, but they do. In Europe,
one should recall the frequent exemptions from
energy or environmental taxes for energy-inten-
sive industries, always because of “competitive-
ness” and what is invariably industry’s willingness
to accept equivalent, conventional, regulatory con-
straints that allow them to retain the scarcity rent.
For these participants in the political system, taxes
are the least preferred alternative and tradable
permits are acceptable, even in cap-and-trade
form,if the scarcity rent that the inefficient,default
command-and-control system would award them,
is not disturbed.7
Whither tradable permits?
Two different approaches have been taken in
adopting and implementing tradable permit sys-
tems. The first is what might be called the de novo
approach whereby a new regulatory system is
developed usually to deal with a new environmen-
tal problem, or at least one that is not dealt with
directly by the existing system of environmental
controls. The US Acid Rain Program and the pro-
posed EU GHG Emissions Trading Programs are
salient examples. These de novo programs invari-
ably draw the most attention and their adoption is
usually time-consuming and contentious for the
very reasons that have been mentioned above.The
nature of the environmental problem, the level of
the cap, and the allocation of allowances are all
likely to be matters of lengthy debate in any demo-
cratic society; however, once consensus is formed
and a decision made, these programs can be imple-
mented relatively quickly and effectively.
The other approach, which can be observed cur-
rently only in the United States, is one in which a
tradable permit system supplants an existing con-
ventional regulatory program. These programs
arise when regulators realize that the goals of the
conventional environmental program cannot be
achieved, despite ample authority, usually because
the specific targets of control are not as obvious as
they were in the first wave of environmental regu-
lation or because the economic and political costs
of implementing the program as prescribed are too
high, or even infeasible. Examples in the United
States are the Northeastern NOx Budget Program








5 The Swedish NOx emission tax is a notable exception that sup-
ports the point. The revenue from the tax on NOx emissions is
returned to incumbents on a basis other than current emissions.
6 The rents in conventional regulation are capitalized in the facility
to which the permit is attached.This value accounts for a portion of
the usual excess of the sale price over book value for many existing
powerplants, refineries, and other industrial facilities.
7 Perhaps, no better current example exists that the recent
(December 2002) compromise concerning auctioning and grandfa-
thering in the EU Emissions Trading Directive. Despite strong
arguments in favor of auctioning, at least 90% (i.e., not excluding
all) of the permits will be grandfathered, that is, distributed gratis
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and the RECLAIM programs in the Los Angeles
Basin, for both of which the caps are set at levels
that would have been achieved, in theory, by the
existing command-and-control systems. In recog-
nizing the impracticability of the detailed regula-
tion to reach these goals, the regulator opts to
attain the environmental goal by abandoning the
pretense of making firm-level abatement decisions.
A notable feature of this path,which is implement-
ed by regulatory agreement and not by legislation,
is that the rights to emit are retained by the incum-
bents, as they would be, had the default command-
and-control system been practicable. The end
result is that the tradable permit system quietly
supplants the default command-and-control sys-
tem.
A familiar analogy
The development of tradable permits recalls a sim-
ilar, much earlier common pool resource problem
that all societies have had to confront: land. Like
clean air and water, land was once freely available
for the taking, but the increase of human activity
made it scarce and all human societies have had to
devise institutions to allocate the scarcity.Over the
centuries, societies of widely differing historical
and cultural traditions have devised institutions to
distribute the rights to the use of land, and the
rents that go with them. For advanced industrial
systems, hardly anyone questions that a decentral-
ized system of private property rights provides a
better allocation than any other practicable
method of managing this scarcity. The initial allo-
cation of these rights may have been coercive and
unfair, but that ancient act is lost in the mists of
history and no one really cares now, even though a
significant portion of everyone’s lifetime income is
devoted to acquiring the right to call a small piece
of the earth home. Until recently, private property
rights in land were strongly contested by some and
large societies have attempted to implement sys-
tems that would manage the scarcity through cen-
tralized allocation, but they succeeded only in
proving the incapacity of such an approach. The
question now is whether the current common pool
resource problem, the environment, can be dealt
with any more successfully by centralized methods.
If not,we should not be surprised to observe a sim-
ilar decentralized, property rights system for the
environment.
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OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
– KILLING ONE BIRD WITH TWO STONES
NICK JOHNSTONE*
E
conomists have long made the theoretical case
for the use of tradable permits (TPs) as an envi-
ronmentally effective and economically efficient
means of addressing environmental externalities.
This has been given increased empirical support with
the successful introduction of a number of schemes
in the United States over the last two decades, with
the SO2 Allowance Trading Program being the most
visible recent example (see OECD 2002 for a discus-
sion of some recent programmes).Moreover,a num-
ber of other countries have started to introduce TP
systems as well, for a variety of different types of
environmental impacts. In the area of CO2 this has
been given increased impetus with the endorsement
of TPs within the context of the Kyoto Protocol,
most particularly by the European Commission
which has prepared a draft directive on GHG emis-
sions trading.
However,TP schemes are almost never introduced
as “stand-alone” schemes.They co-exist with – and
interact with – other environmental policy instru-
ments with the same, or very similar, environmen-
tal objectives. A key public policy issue is, there-
fore, to evaluate when and whether it makes sense
to use two instruments to hit one target.This paper
seeks to examine this question by analysing some
of the potential interactions between TPs and
other environmental policy instruments. It does so
with reference to four other types of instrument
which frequently interact with TP schemes: direct
regulations such as performance and technology
standards, environmental taxes or charges, subsi-
dies for abatement inputs or capital equipment,
and voluntary policy approaches.
Tradable permits and direct regulation
In many senses most TP regimes have emerged out
of direct forms of regulation. The original Amer-
ican EPA Emissions Trading Program is the clear-
est example of such a case. However, even more
recent TP schemes have been underpinned by pre-
existing regulatory schemes. In some cases, this is
primarily of importance for distributional reasons.
For instance, under Los Angeles County’s
RECLAIM program for NOx and SOx, permits
were allocated gratis to firms according to estimat-
ed emissions that would have arisen under the reg-
ulatory system that it replaced.
In other cases the effects are much more far-reach-
ing. This is particularly true of baseline-and-credit
schemes in which credits for emissions reduced are
the units which are traded, rather than permits for
emissions actually generated. Under such schemes,
it is important to be able to determine when an
emission which would have otherwise been emit-
ted is deemed to have been abated.Some notion of
a ‘baseline’ level of emissions is, therefore, the
point against which the credit is generated.
In most baseline-and-credit schemes the baseline is
that level which would be emitted if the firm complied
with the existing regulatory system. For instance,
under the EPA’s Clean Air Act’s Emissions
Reduction Credit Program credits are created when
firms reduce their emissions below the level allowed
by their operating permit (see Hahn and Hester
1989).Similarly,in the Swiss VOC permit trading pro-
gram in the Canton of Basel in Switzerland which was
initiated in 1993, credits were created for emission
reduction below the emission performance standard
(75 mg/m3)1 (see Jeanrenaud 1999).And finally,under
the American Lead-in-Gasoline trading program,
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credits were earned if fuel was manufactured by
refineries with a lower lead content than that man-
dated by regulatory limits. (See Stavins 2001.)
In other schemes, regulatory constraints are used to
restrict the use of TPs in order to protect local envi-
ronmental conditions. For instance, in the United
Kingdom,the architects of the proposed programme
for NOx and SOx trading have made it clear that the
regime would have to protect
local environmental conditions.
However, it is not clear whether
this would require the applica-
tion of “Best Available Techno-
logies” as mandated under the
European Commission’s IPPC
Directive. This would severely
restrict trading opportunities
(see Palmer and Davies 2002).
Even under the American SO2
Allowance Trading programme,
some states have imposed regula-
tory constraints on the scope for
trading in order to protect local
environmental conditions. For
instance, in Wisconsin, local air
pollution regulations prevented
generators from buying permits
even though their marginal costs
exceeded the prevailing permit
price. In Illinois, the use of scrub-
bers was mandated (see Conrad
and Kohn 1996 and Fullerton et
al. 1997). In New York, the
Department of Environmental
Conservation filed a suit to force
the EPA to use “deposition stan-
dards” to restrict the use of per-
mits in environmentally sensitive
areas (see Tietenberg 1995).
What are the costs of such
restrictions? Fullerton et al.
(1997) estimated that applying
minimum performance stan-
dards in the SO2 program in-
creases costs more than two-
fold. Farrell et al (1999) provide
similar results for the American
Northeast’s NOx programme.
(For a hypothetical numerical
illustration see Box.) However,
neither of these studies look at whether the benefits
of constraining trade through regulatory require-
ments in order to protect local environmental condi-
tions outweigh the increase in compliance costs. A
single undifferentiated market would also be sub-
optimal, resulting in non-equalisation of marginal
benefits and costs.
The key point is that because of the administrative
cost of using one instrument to target the impacts
Box : The Costs of Regulatory Constraints on Permit Trading
The costs of introducing a regulatory constraint (a minimum perform-
ance standard) on a firm within a permit trading system can be
illustrated with a hypothetical permit trading market.  Assume that prior
to the introduction of any type of environmental regulation, two firms
emit 40 units of a particular pollutant.  The two firms have the following
hypothetical total abatement cost (TAC) curves:
Firm 1: TAC = 20 + 4 EA
2
Firm 2: TAC = 10 + 2 EA
2
Where TAC is total abatement costs and EA is emissions abated.  The fi-
gure below shows total and marginal abatement costs for Firm 1 (Firm 2)
increasing from left to right (right to left) as levels of abatement rise
along the horizontal axis. Upon the introduction of a TP system which
caps emissions at 20 units, firms are allocated 10 permits each. Total
costs will be minimised at the point at which marginal costs for the two
firms are equal.  This point is reached at the heavily shaded line to the
left, when firm 1 buys approximately 3 units from firm 2, at a permit
price of $52, and total abatement costs of $563 (the sum of the two
arrows A and B).
Assume now that the regulatory authority decides to protect local
environmental conditions in the jurisdictions where each of the plants
are located by placing a regulatory constraint (such as a performance
standard) of 10 units on firm 2. This might be a result of a concern that
damages rise sharply above this level.  In this case, the equilibrium is the
heavily-shaded line to the right and total costs would rise to $630 (the
sum of the two arrows C and D). Costs of compliance are, therefore,
approximately 20% higher than in the case where permit trading is not
restricted. Whether or not this results in improved economic efficiency
depends upon the relationship between marginal damages of emissions
from the two plants.directly in a differentiated manner which allows
for marginal costs to equal marginal benefits for all
emitters, a combination of policies is applied.2 If
applied efficiently this can be a ‘second-best’ poli-
cy option.Abatement cost minimisation for a given
level of emissions is achieved through the use of
the TP system, while still insuring against breaches
of local environmental thresholds and other non-
linearities in damage functions through regulatory
constraints.
In other areas, the case for the retention of regula-
tory constraints is less evident. For instance, it has
been proposed that the use of energy efficiency
standards in the European Union’s IPPC be
retained even after the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme for greenhouse gases has been introduced.
While the objectives of the energy efficiency stan-
dards are broader than just climate change mitiga-
tion – indeed, their environmental objectives are
manifold – it is clear that the retention of mandat-
ed energy efficiency standards may reduce the
potential gains from trade within the Emissions
Trading Scheme.
This can be seen by examining a typical firm’s
objective function. The firm seeks to maximize
profits, taking into account both production costs
(PC) and compliance costs (CC). The latter are
made up of both abatement costs (A) and permit
use (P).3 Capital (K), labour (L), and energy (E)
are used both in production and abatement. The
effect of the energy efficiency standard can be seen
as a constraint on the firm’s choice of factor inputs.
In effect, the firm will not be able to use a ratio of
energy use to output in excess of (E/Q)*.The max-
imization problem is, therefore:
∏ = P*Q – PC(K,L,E) – CC(A(K,L,E),P) 
s.t. E/Q < (E/Q)*
If (E/Q)* is less than would be the ratio chosen by
the firm in the absence of the constraint, potential
gains from trade will be lost. In effect, the firm will
not be able to optimise its permit use. If this is not
the case, then the performance standard is redun-
dant. As such, the standard can only increase (or
hold constant) compliance costs. Whether or not
this cost is worth paying depends upon the effi-
ciency of the standard in meeting the other envi-
ronmental objectives for which it has been intro-
duced.
Tradable permits and environmentally related
Taxes
There has also been considerable experience with
the joint application of TPs and pollution taxes,
particularly: as a means to reduce compliance cost
uncertainty; and, as a means to capture windfall
rents or tax revenue. The potential desirability of
the joint application of taxes and permits (rather
than using one or the other on its own) to reduce
compliance cost uncertainty has been recognised
for a considerable length of time. In particular,
Roberts and Spence (1976) proved that the joint
application of the two instruments was preferable
in the presence of: A) non-linear environmental
damages; and B) uncertainty concerning abate-
ment costs. In effect, by delimiting the bounds of
permit price uncertainty through taxes (and subsi-
dies), the potential welfare losses from the regula-
tory authority either over-estimating or under-esti-
mating marginal abatement costs can be reduced.
This has been dubbed the “safety valve” argument.
By putting a cap on permit prices, regulatory
authorities are able to convince risk-averse affect-
ed firms and households of the desirability of
introducing a TP regime. In Denmark, the govern-
ment explicitly used a “safety-valve” argument in
setting the penalty at 40 DKK ($US 4.78)/ton of
CO2. In addition, some commentators have argued
that the CFC tax in the United States was the bind-
ing instrument, and not the Ozone-Depleting
Substances Program (see Stavins 2001).
It would, of course, be possible to achieve similar
objectives within the TP system itself. For instance,
under the SO2 Allowance Trading program the
government holds reserves of permits which it
would release onto the market if the price were to
reach $US 1,500 (see Tietenberg 1998). However,
this has the disadvantage that the price can only be
capped for as long as the reserve holds – excessive
demand will eventually drive the price higher.
Thus,the price effects are less certain,undermining
the benefits in terms of reduced uncertainty. On
the other hand,the environmental effects are more
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2The usual economic case for the efficiency of marginal cost equal-
isation is really just a special case in which marginal benefits of
abatement are equal across emission sources.
3 Note that this is true even if permits are allocated gratis to the
firm, since the firm will still face an opportunity cost for each and






certain with a permit reserve since under a tax-
based price cap the government has no direct con-
trol over any unforeseen increase in emissions aris-
ing from the cap.
Another potential use of taxes in conjunction with
TP regimes arises from the common use of gratis
allocations of TPs rather than auctions.Whether this
is done on the basis of historical emissions (grandfa-
thering) or regulatory requirements or some other
mechanism, firms will receive a windfall rent equal
to the value of the permits allocated. In order to
recover some of these windfall rents, taxes can be
applied in conjunction with the TP regime. This
appears to have been the motivation behind the use
of the CFC tax in conjunction with the ODS
Program in the United States. Initially set at $1.37/lb
in 1990, it rose to $5.35 in 1995 (see Harrison 1999).
This tax is paid on all CFCs sold and is complemen-
tary with the permit trading program.Thus,irrespec-
tive of the permit price, the tax has to be paid.
In a closely related vein, the desire of governments
to retain at least some of the revenue from pre-
existing environmentally-related taxes has also
been a motivation for the joint application of taxes
and TP systems. For instance, the United King-
dom’s Emissions Trading Scheme for greenhouse
gases co-exists with the Climate Change Levy
which imposes a tax on coal, gas and electricity use
on business, commerce and the public sector.
While the target groups of the two programs is
somewhat different – with the ETS targeted
upstream and the CCL downstream – the two poli-
cies interact in two ways. Firstly even for those
downstream electricity users which are not them-
selves subject to the ETS, they will face price
increases for electricity which are additional to the
CCL. In addition, some coal and gas users will face
a target under the ETS as well as be subject to the
CCL (see Sorrell 2003).This results in double reg-
ulation, with externalities for at least some emis-
sions from some sources being double-internalised.
Tradable permits and subsidies
The use of environmentally-motivated subsidies in
conjunction with of TP schemes is less widespread
than the use of taxes or direct regulations with TPs,
but there are still some important examples. Two
areas will be highlighted. Firstly, financial subsidies
are sometimes provided for improved environmen-
tal performance. In some cases, such subsidies are
targeted at the level of investment (i.e.capital depre-
ciation allowances for abatement technologies); in
other cases they are targeted at specific inputs or
outputs (i.e. tax exemptions on sales of renewable
energy); and, in still other cases they are targeted
much further upstream at technology development
(i.e. public support for research and development in
environmentally-benign technologies).
As long as the subsidies co-exist with a cap-and-
trade system they will not undermine the environ-
mental effectiveness of the TPs. However, they will
not increase the environmental effectiveness either.
Moreover, they will have effects on the distribution
of impacts across firms and the economic efficiency
of the system.For instance,under the SO2Allowance
Trading Progam, the public utility commissions of
some states have provided favourable tax treatment
for capital expenditures on scrubbers relative to
expenditures on permits, low-sulphur coal and other
compliance strategies (see Bailey 1996).
The effect of the subsidy will be to distort decision-
making. Affected SO2 emitters will be encouraged
to purchase scrubbers in excess of the level which
would be optimal. This will not improve the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the program in a global
sense, but will merely drive down permit prices by
releasing permits onto the market and encouraging
other firms to use permits as a compliance strategy.
It will also increase overall costs, above and
beyond the costs associated with the direct finan-
cial implications of the subsidy.
Secondly, in other cases the relationship between
subsidies and TP schemes is more direct. Indeed,
perhaps the best-known combination between a
TP system and the provision of subsidies is the
United Kingdom’s “sellers’ auction” for CO2 emis-
sion reductions under the UK Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) (see Kitamori 2002 for a discus-
sion). In a decreasing-price auction firms bid for
government-provided subsidies against emissions
reductions relative to their baseline emissions in
1998-2000. In total £215 million in subsidies will be
provided in the period 2002–2006 (see DETR,
22/03/2002). In the first auction the price for
allowances was £53.37/tonne.4The firm can sell any
4 This is not equivalent to the market price for the cost of abate-
ment of a tonne of carbon due to the annual nature of the commit-
ment and other factors.allowances for any reductions that it undertakes in
excess of the amount for which it has bid.
While the ability to sell excess allowances is clear-
ly characteristic of baseline-and-credit TP sys-
tems, the importance of the financial incentive for
participation in the scheme is significant.In effect,
the bidding scheme is perhaps best understood
merely as a potentially efficient means of the allo-
cation of subsidies.Instead of granting investment
funds through detailed project applications on the
one hand, or in a non-discretionary manner
through undifferentiated subsidies on the other
hand, firms are encouraged to reveal the true
costs of abatement through the auction.However,
the economic efficiency of the programme is
dependent upon effective auction design, such
that firms are not able to behave collusively in
order to minimise reductions relative to the subsi-
dies available.
Tradable permits and voluntary approaches
Voluntary approaches to environmental policy can
be integrated with TPs in two important ways:
• Adherence to TP systems by firms can be made
voluntary through the use of ‘opt ins’; and,
• Emission reductions agreed to under voluntary
agreements can be used as a means to allocate
permits in a grandfathered TP scheme.
If the permits are auctioned,no firm would be like-
ly to volunteer to be involved in the program in the
absence of a regulatory threat or a financial
inducement. In the case where permits are allocat-
ed gratis, the question is significantly more compli-
cated since such schemes are characterised by
strategic behaviour and financial uncertainty.
Unlike under a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme
the firm does not know what the ultimate “cap”
will be, since this depends upon how many (and
which) firms volunteer.
In effect, each firm faces a different expected ben-
efit and cost schedule depending upon which other
firms are involved. In some cases the net benefits
will be positive and in some cases they will be neg-
ative relative to the case where they continued to
adhere to some existing regulatory regime. It is
possible that the distribution of costs and benefits
is such that no firm will volunteer, even if it is in
their collective interest to do so.Indeed,this is why
the United Kingdom subsidised firms to partici-
pate in their ETS programme.
In most extant cases, however, voluntary adherence
is only an option for a sub-set of firms, with most
firms being mandatory participants. This is the case
with the EPA’s SO2Allowance Trading Program.It is
also the case with Pennsylvania’s NOx Allowance
Retirement Program which is mandatory for fossil-
fuel powered electric generating plants, but volun-
tary for others (Stavins 2001). Similarly, under
RECLAIM it is possible for mobile sources and
small point sources to volunteer to become involved
(see Nash and Revesz 2000).
To a great extent allowing for voluntary adher-
ence for some firms while preserving a core of
firms for which the cap-and-trade programme is
mandatory simplifies the decision for the firm
since if the number of potential “voluntary” firms
is small relative to the number of “mandatory”
firms, the permit price can be taken as given.This
also means that the regulator faces less uncertain-
ty about the likely number of firms that are to be
involved.
However, even in such cases voluntary adherence
can raise concerns.The case of the SO2 Allowance
Program is instructive. Between 1996 and 1999
the percentage of emissions that were attribut-
able to “opt-ins” was between 12% and 13%
(www.epa.gov/airmarkets). However, Montero
(2000) found that this »substitution« provision of
the program tended to be taken up by those firms
which were grandfathered emissions far in excess
of actual emissions. An increase of one standard
deviation in the firm’s allocation of permits rela-
tive to actual emissions increased the probability
of “volunteering” from 32% to 84%. Indeed, the
“adverse selection” effect dominated the effects
of productive efficiency.
An important additional point relates to the treat-
ment of existing “voluntary” commitments in the
determination of permit allocations within TP
schemes.In recent years,there have been extensive
discussions in different programmes about the
extent to which reductions achieved through for-
mal  “voluntary” approaches (negotiated agree-
ments, etc…) should be included in the allocation
of permits and in the evaluation of their baseline.
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For instance, in the CEC’s (2001) proposal for an
allowance trading programme for GHGs it is stat-
ed that “the target set under the [negotiated] envi-
ronmental agreements can serve as a useful basis
for the allocation of allowances by Member
States”.This would,however,be politically difficult
to achieve if the scope of the permit trading
scheme is broader than the scope of the pre-exist-
ing agreement since firms which were not party to
the agreement would benefit. More generally, this
may raise the issue of »moral hazard«, making it
exceedingly difficult for governments to negotiate
agreements with firms in future due to the possi-
bility of this affecting future permit allocations.
These ambiguities are even more important in
credit-and-baseline schemes where credit creation
is affected by the choice of the baseline. In some
cases, the distinction may result in a switch from
the firm being a net buyer rather than net seller of
permits.This can be seen in the Figure, where for a
given price of permits a firm shifts from being a net
seller if voluntary commitments are not included
to a net buyer if they are. In the Canadian Pilot
Emission Reduction Trading Program, Trading
Rule 2.4.3 states an emission reduction is surplus if
it is not otherwise required of a source by current
regulations or other obligations (e.g. a voluntary
commitment).The precise meaning of a “voluntary
commitment” was to be elaborated by a special
Task Team. In their deliberations it was proposed
that one required element for a “voluntary com-
mitment” was that it includes a “negotiated agree-
ment between an organization and the government
and/or ENGO’s such as a Memorandum of
Understanding” (see Humphries 2000).
Conclusions 
In practice TP systems almost
always co-exist with other envi-
ronmental policy instruments.
In some cases (i.e to protect
local environmental conditions,
to reduce compliance cost
uncertainty, encourage addi-
tional abatement),a case can be
made for their joint applica-
tion. However, in other cases
the secondary instrument will
be at best redundant and at




tiveness. Thus, whenever introducing a tradable
permit system it is vitally important to understand
the links with pre-existing policies. In some cases
adjustments may need to be made to ensure com-
plementarity. In other cases, it may be advisable to
scrap the policy altogether.
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TRADABLE PERMITS –
TEN KEY DESIGN ISSUES
FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER*
AND ALEXANDER F. WAGNER**
Introduction
I
n this paper, we provide a guide for policymak-
ers who consider using tradable permits as an
environmental policy tool. Most of the issues we
discuss are relevant both in the domestic and the
international realm, although some have particular
significance in one of the two areas.
In recent years, tradable permits (TP) have become
rather widespread in use.1 The table overleaf gives an
overview of some of the numerous experiments, in
particular in the US. There is a wealth of resources
available that comment on the success of these pro-
grams (Stavins 2002). One noteworthy point is that
the international experience is rather small. Europe
has only relatively recently begun to develop such
programs. For example, in Denmark, the Ministry of
the Environment fixes annual emissions ceilings in
the power generation industry, and leaves the actual
allocation to the country’s two power plant consortia.
The UK allowed intra-firm trading of SO2-allowances
among large combustion plants from 1991 to 1997.
But inter-firm trading was not allowed (Sorrell 1999).
The system in the Netherlands, where electric power
producers face emissions standards for SO2 and NOx
but can comply through cost-sharing arrangements
whereby plants with higher abatement costs are com-
pensated, has resulted in intra-firm trading (Klaassen
and Nentjes 1997). In Germany, the transfer of emis-
sion reduction obligations among firms in air quality
non-attainment areas is allowed.The cost-savings have
been estimated to be very limited (Schaerer 1994).The
most recent experiment with market-based instru-
ments is the UK Emission Trading Scheme, aimed at
achieving the UK’s commitment under the – yet to be
ratified – Kyoto Protocol. Schneider and Wagner
(2002) describe the program in detail. Since the first
auction only took place in March 2002,and trading has
been somewhat limited so far, it is too early to make
an assessment concerning the success of the program.
What lessons can we learn from these programs,some
of which have been “grand policy experiments”
(Stavins 1998)? In this guide for policymakers, we
focus exclusively on design and implementation
issues and we draw on theoretical and empirical work
on this question. Of course, there is no blueprint for
the perfect system.It is our belief,however,that when
tradable permit systems are used where they are
appropriate, then heeding the lessons from the past
increases the chances of the system leading to the
desired outcome (in particular a cost-effective attain-
ment of pre-set environmental goals).The balance of
the paper deals with ten such key design issues.
Trading of emissions versus inputs
In principle, we would want to regulate risks and
impacts. However, it is quite difficult to trade risks
directly. This is why policy typically moves one or
two steps away from this level, leading to either
emission permit trading or input permit trading.
For example, a true CO2 trading program would
* Professor Dr. Friedrich Schneider, Department of Economics,
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Altenberger Strasse 69, A-
4040 Linz,Austria (friedrich.schneider@jku.ac.at).
** Dr. Alexander F. Wagner, Program in Political Economy and
Government, Department of Economics, Harvard University,
Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Research Fellow,
Environmental Economics Program at Harvard University, and
Research Fellow, Energieinstitut, Johannes Kepler University of
Linz (awagner@fas.harvard.edu).
Part of this paper is based on Wagner and Schneider (2003).
1 This should not obscure the fact, however, that tradeable permits
are not the only game in town. In fact, important trade-offs with
alternative environmental policy instruments need to be consid-
ered. For space reasons, it is not possible to adequately deal with
these trade-offs here, and so we can only point the reader to the
more extensive survey (Wagner and Schneider 2003) where ques-
tions like the optimal timing of environmental policy in the pres-
ence of significant uncertainties and irreversibilities and the rela-
tive merits of different policy instruments with respect to cost effi-
ciency, environmental effectiveness, administrative practicability,
dynamic efficiency and incentives for technological innovation,and
political acceptability are discussed (Summary tables of the relative
advantages and disadvantages can be found in the appendix of this
paper). One particularly important insight developed recently in a
number of papers (Abel et al. 1995; Arrow and Fisher 1974; Chao
1995; Dixit and Pindyck 1998; Hassett and Metcalf 1994; Kolstad
1992; Pindyck 2000) concerns the fact that policy decisions with
respect to climate change are essentially irreversible and delay of
action is possible. Under these conditions, waiting has optionality
value; thus, the observed delay in climate policy implementations
may at least partially be an optimal response to the prevailing
uncertainties.correspond to the first type; a carbon (content)
trading program belongs to the second group. In
general, the choice between the two depends on
the degree of uniform mixing of the pollutant. For
example, it would be problematic to have a sulfur-
content trading program because SO2 is a highly
non-uniformly mixed pollutant – which is why the
US has chosen to implement an SO2 allowance
trading program. Aside from this physical proper-
ty, there is also an economic or political
aspect:administrative feasibility.Clearly,the closer
to the actual impacts regulation takes place, the
more complex it gets. Taken together, these two
factors suggest an important trade-off.
Mandatory versus voluntary
Some observers have argued that a mandatory
scheme is likely to be more environmentally effec-
tive. This is not necessarily true since significant
emissions reductions may also be attained through
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Some selected tradeable permit systems (Stavins 2002)
Country Program Traded Commodity Period of Operation Environmental and 
Economic Effects
Canada ODS Allowance  CFCs and Methyl  1993–1996;  Low trading volume, 
Trading Chloroform; HCFCs; 1996–present; except among large methyl
Methyl Bromide 1995–present; bromide allowance holders
PERT GERT NOx, VOCs, CO, SO2, 1996–present;
CO2 1997–present
Chile Santiago Air Total suspended 1995–present Low trading volume; 
Emissions Trading particulates emission decrease in emissions since
rights trading among 1997 not definitely tied to
stationary source TP system
European ODS Quotat ODS production  1991–1994 More rapid phaseout of 
Union Trading quots under ODS
Montreal Protocol
Singspore ODS Permit Permits for use and 1991–present Increase in permit prices;
Trading distribution of ODS environmental benefits
unknown
United Emissions Trading CO2 emissions 2002–present Unknown
Kingdom Program
United Emissions Trading Criteria air pollutants 1974–present Performance uneffected;
States under CAA savings = $5–12 billion
Lead Gasoline Rights for lead in 1982–1987 More rapid phaseout of
Phasedown gasoline among leaded gasoline; $250 m
refineries annual savings
Water Quality Point-nonpoint 1984–1986 No trading occurred
Trading sources of nitrogen because ambient standards
and phosphorus not binding
CFC Trades for Production rights for 1987–present Environmental targets
Ozone Protection some CFCs, based on achieved ahead of 
depletion potential schedule; effect of TP
system unclear
Heavy Duty Engine  Averaging, banking, 1992–present Standards achieved; cost
Trading and trading of credits savings unknown
for NOx and partic-
ulate emissions
Acid Rain Reduction SO2 emission 1995–present SO2 reductions achieved 
reduction credits; ahead of schedule; savings
mainly among of $1 billion/year
electric utilities
RECLAM SO2 and NOx 1994–present Unknown
Program emissions among
stationary sources
N.E. Ozone Primarily NOx 1999–present Unknown
Transport emissions by large
stationary sourcesCESifo Forum 1/2003 17
Focus
voluntary participation. What is correct, however,
is that mandatory schemes will in all likelihood be
more cost-effective. Why? Under a voluntary
scheme only entities that expect themselves to be
sellers will join the scheme (even if they end up
being buyers after all). In other words, there is a
strong element of adverse selection involved, as
has been shown for the case of the SO2 program by
Montero2 (1999). Thus, abatement cost hetero-
geneity will be lower under a voluntary scheme,
leading – for a given environmental goal – to lower
cost-savings. Transaction costs for companies join-
ing industrial opt-in programs have typically been
high (Atkeson 1997).
Absolute versus relative baselines
Typically, the difference between relative and
absolute targets is argued to be as follows (Bode
2002): One limits total emissions to some absolute
amount and may therefore limit “growth,“ while
the other is presumed to impose less of a constraint
on growth in output, albeit at the cost of some
growth in emissions. As Ellerman (2002) points
out,the U.S.experience with both systems does not
provide much support for this distinction.3 But it is
not clear whether this experience is also relevant
for the choice of baselines in climate change policy,
for example. Indeed, one of the major components
of the US Climate Plan announced in February
2002 is the concept of moving away from commit-
ting to a national emission cap by a specified date
(such as is embodied in Kyoto) to a targeted rate of
decline in emissions intensity of the economy.
Kolstad (2002) argues that this part of the propos-
al does have some merit, on the grounds that it
addresses the problem with the emissions cap
approach of Kyoto that requires continual renego-
tiation of the caps as we proceed through time. It
also does not have the (psychological and possibly
real) effect of hindering growth for developing
countries.Finally,an intensity target has the advan-
tage of resolving some uncertainty, since other the
absolute baseline significant cost uncertainty arises
from a combination of uncertainty over how much
an economy may grow by the time the commitment
period arrives. The last word is still out on this
issue.
Apart from this, two other reasons argue for using
absolute baselines in national programs.The prob-
lem is that without a specified baseline, reductions
must be credited to an unobservable hypothetical –
what the source would have emitted in the absence
of the regulation. Second, as was experienced with
EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, relative base-
lines create significant transaction costs by essen-
tially requiring prior approval of trades as the
authority investigates the claimed counterfactual
from which reductions are calculated and credits
generated (Nichols, Farr, and Hester 1996).
Grandfathering versus auction
Almost all emission trading programs in action
have started with grandfathered permits. For
example, the most important emission trading pro-
gram so far,the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990
dealing with SO2 trading provide for annual auc-
tions in addition to grandfathering – but such auc-
tions involve less than three percent of the total
allocation. Overall, the auctions have proven to be
a trivial part of the overall program (Joskow,
Schmalensee, and Bailey 1996). This is astounding
since on the theoretical level, there seem to be
compelling reasons for auctioned permits.
First of all, with perfect information and no trans-
action costs, trading will result in the economically
efficient outcome independently of the initial dis-
tribution of permits (Montgomery 1972). Second,
auctions are more cost-effective in the presence of
certain kinds of transaction costs. Third, the rev-
enue raised can be used to reduce other distortions
(Goulder and Bovenberg 1996). Note also that
while instruments such as tradable permits can cre-
ate entry barriers that raise product prices, reduce
the real wage, and exacerbate preexisting labor
supply distortions, this effect can be offset if the
government auctions the permits, retains the
scarcity rents,and recycles the revenue by reducing
distortionary labor taxes. Fourth, auctions provide
greater incentives for firms to develop substitutes
(see the section on technological progress). Fifth,
due to the revenue raised by auctions, administra-
tive agencies may have a bigger incentive to moni-
tor compliance (Ackermann and Stewart 1985).
2 However, the environmental effects must be kept in perspective.
The number of allowances that could be considered excess
amounted to only 3% of the total issued during 1995–1999 and the
inflation of the cap during the time when these banked allowances
will be used is only about 2%.Thus, these effects do not appear to
have threatened the overall integrity of the allowance program.
3 On the one hand, the consumption of coal has not been percepti-
bly reduced by the imposition of a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions.
Rather, more low-sulfur coal is produced and a number of units
have retrofitted scrubbers. On the other hand, the lead phase-
down, which is the prototypical averaging (i.e. relative baseline)
program, has not lead to more output of leaded gasoline.Finally, grandfathering can lead unregulated firms
to increase their emissions in order to maximize
the pollution rights that they obtain if there is a
transition to a market-based system (Dewees
1983). Overall, under almost any circumstances to
be encountered in the real world, an auction of
emission rights is preferable to grandfathering.
In addition to these considerations, questions of
equity but also of dynamic efficiency will guide the
treatment of new sources. Obviously, the decision
will depend on the competitiveness of the market –
the policy decision here is as much industrial poli-
cy as it is environmental policy.
Allocations and efficiency in the international
context
Chichilnisky (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal
(1994) point out that the presumption that equal
marginal abatement costs are the correct condition
for efficiency is not strictly correct. The reason for
this is that,simply,a dollar to a person in the devel-
oping world does not have the same welfare impli-
cations as a dollar to a developed world person.
What matters are the real opportunity costs.
Formally, the authors find that Pareto efficiency
requires that the marginal cost of abatement in
each country must be inversely related to that
country’s marginal valuation for the private good.
This has strong policy implications: If richer coun-
tries have a lower marginal valuation of the private
good, then at a Pareto-efficient allocation, they
should have a larger marginal cost of abatement
than the lower-income countries.With diminishing
returns to abatement, this implies that they should
push abatement further. Summarizing, the alloca-
tion of property rights in a tradable permit system
is important if environmental quality has a direct
impact on wellbeing and marginal valuations of
private goods differ strongly across countries.
The main policy implication for the design of effi-
cient permit trading programs concerns the alloca-
tion of rights. Even after choosing to go with trad-
able permits as the environmental policy instru-
ment, we need to carefully use the degree of free-
dom left in terms of the distribution of property
rights.4 Whenever politicians bring up equity
issues, economists are quick to point out that those
have nothing to do with efficiency. For once it
seems that politicians are right, if not in their rea-
soning.
Banking and borrowing
The US has had significant experience with pro-
grams that allow intertemporal trading,in particular
banking. Two lessons emerge from this experience
(Ellerman 2002): First, when allowed and coupled
with a phased-in reduction requirement, banking
will be used and it will accelerate the timing of emis-
sion reductions. Studies of the US Acid Rain
Program also find that firms have learned very well
how to optimally accumulate and draw down banks
(Ellerman and Montero 2002).Second,the ability of
banking to dampen allowance price fluctuations
may be important when the spatial scope of the cap
is limited.5 In fact, this second point hints at the
importance of a temporal safety valve that may
allow agents to borrow in times of extraordinary
demand. Of course, there is good reason to restrict
temporal flexibility when the environmental prob-
lem is other than a stock pollutant.
Market power and the design of emission permit
markets
In order for cost minimization gains to be fully
realized, the emission trading market must work in
a competitive manner. If some agents have the
capacity to influence the transaction price of trad-
ed permits or can prevent the entrance of competi-
tors by hoarding permits, efficiency losses may
ensue (OECD 2001). For example, Hahn (1984a)
shows that the deviation of abatement costs from
the cost minimum is related to the extent to which
the initial distribution of permits differs from the
equilibrium distribution (and to the price elasticity
of demand).
Another type of strategic behavior occurs if firms
use the permit market to drive up rivals’ costs
(exclusionary manipulation). Note first that this
can only occur if firms operating in the same indus-
try also participate in the same permit market.
Misiolek and Elder (1989) conclude that, surpris-
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4 Chichilnisky et al.(2000) concentrate on the first welfare theorem
in markets in which agents trade, at a uniform price (that is, not at
personalized Lindahl prices), permits to produce privately pro-
duced public goods.They take the total quantity of permits fixed by
the government at a level consistent with Pareto efficiency. They
show that the equilibria are nevertheless generally inefficient, due
to the public good character of one of the traded goods. But the
main surprise is that there exist certain allocations of rights to emit
from which the market overcomes the »free rider« problem and
achieves efficiency.This is a key characteristic of competitive mar-
kets for privately produced public goods.
5 This was important to bring price levels back to normal in the
RECLAIM NOx program in the US after the California electricity
market crises in late 2000 and early 2001.CESifo Forum 1/2003 19
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ingly, this may not necessarily have a negative
impact on cost efficiency. It is unclear to what
extent this result survives the inclusion of uncer-
tainty. Experimental studies and anecdotal evi-
dence from existing permit markets suggest that
this is probably not a major problem – at least for
domestic programs. On the international level,
things may look different. As regards carbon trad-
ing, a particularly important danger seems to be
that Russia and the Ukraine exert market power.
In a first attempt to estimate the costs of such a sit-
uation, Burniaux (1999) finds that by 2010 the
price of Assigned Amount Units (the term for
emission permits that the Kyoto protocol uses)
would be about 20 per cent higher than under the
competitive scenario (for a discussion see OECD
(2001)). Clearly, the best way to avoid such situa-
tions is for governments to devolve their assigned
amounts to their legal entities and promote indus-
try-level trading (Bader 1996; Hahn 1984b).
Market efficiency, transaction costs 
If we want to rely on environmental markets to
give us efficient results, we must be able to rely on
them in providing informational or market effi-
ciency first.One key to a smooth functioning of the
tradable permit market is a low level of transaction
costs.
Three potential sources of transaction costs in trad-
able permit markets can be identified:(1) search and
information; (2) bargaining and decision (Dwyer
1992; Kohn 1991); and (3) monitoring and enforce-
ment. Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the
prevalence of significant transaction costs in trad-
able permit markets. Atkinson and Tietenberg
(1991) surveyed six empirical studies that found
trading levels in permit markets to be lower than
anticipated by theoretical models. On the other
hand, it has been recognized that success stories like
the EPA’s leaded gasoline phasedown can partially
be attributed to the program’s minimal administra-
tive requirements and the fact that the potential
trading partners (refineries) were already experi-
enced at striking deals with one another.6
Transaction costs in the SO2 market in the US – the
most successful TP market – are now minimal. The
lesson for policymakers is to make administrative
procedures as simple as possible and to equip poten-
tial trading partners with means to efficiently com-
municate market-relevant information with each
other.7
A final word is in order on the international realm.
When governments themselves trade, transactions
could be the result of bilateral bargaining where
emission permits are not the only element of the
transaction; in other words, governments will in
general be motivated by other factors than strict
economic ones. Prior notification by parties and,
more generally, the establishment of specific
exchanges has been advocated to promote compet-
itive behavior (Bohm 1998). First experiments
(Hizen and Saijo 1999) seem to indicate, however,
that disclosure of contract information does gener-
ally not improve market efficiency. Similarly, trad-
ing through an exchange does not seem to improve
significantly the efficiency of the trading regime as
opposed to bilateral trading.These results are sur-
prising and merit further investigation.
Enforcement and management framework
There are two aspects to an enforcement frame-
work: One is the monitoring of compliance with
the regulatory framework and detecting violations.
The other is responding to violations in a way that
ensures that it is always in the interests of partici-
pants to comply. Often, the first aspect is the sim-
pler of the two. For example, for CO2, since it is a
mostly uniformly mixed pollutant, we do not have
to monitor each and every source of CO2 emis-
sions, but can focus on the sales of the major dis-
tributors of carbon-based fuels. In fact, just from
such sources, estimates of the consumption of vari-
ous carbon-based fuels in each country are already
available from data on production, import, export,
and inventories.8
The enforcement poses much more serious prob-
lems, in particular in the international context.
Malik (1990) demonstrates that with imperfect
compliance, firms set the level of emissions such
that marginal profits equal the permit price plus
the expected fine. It can also be shown that if the
marginal penalty of noncompliance is constant,
tradable emission permits lead to less noncompli-
ance than does regulation.With increasing margin-
6 For an overview of quantitative empirical estimates across various
programs, we refer the reader to Wagner and Schneider (2003)
7 Not only the level of transaction costs is important.Stavins (1995)
shows that when transaction costs are dependent on the volume
traded, this may imply that the final equilibrium, and hence cost
efficiency, is no longer independent of the initial distribution of
permits (the precise result depends on the exact shape of transac-
tion costs)..
8 It should be noted that if the lives of quotas are not synchronized
– if they specify a total of emissions over a multiyear life – matters
could be more difficult.al penalties (as a function of the violation), all
firms will comply if the permit price below the
expected per unit violation penalty. With decreas-
ing marginal penalties, firms that decide not to
comply will pollute more than under regulation. In
sum, with imperfect enforcement, whether or not
tradable permits meet the environmental goal
depends on the structure of the penalty function.
With respect to market management more general-
ly, the clear recommendation from economic theo-
ry is to allow market participants to fully exploit
cost-saving opportunities and risk-management
possibilities, for example through the use of deriv-
atives (as they are already traded in the SO2 and
NOx allowance markets in the US). In addition to
facilitating heding price risks, derivatives also help
achieve market depth and liquididy and so
improve market functioning.
Interaction between international and domestic
policies and needs
Sometimes it is argued that it does not matter how
countries enforce given total emission levels
domestically, as long as the allocation of quotas
among countries is clear ”...in principle, any
domestic policy regime is possible.“ (Chichilnisky
and Heal 2000). Hahn and Stavins (1999) deal crit-
icially with this important point, which has re-
ceived surprisingly little attention in the literature
on international environmental agreements.
They start from the observation that the Kyoto
Protocol’s greenhouse gas trading mechanism will
lead to minimized costs if all countries use domes-
tic tradable permit systems to meet their national
targets and allow for international trades.Thus, the
European Union’s proposal to introduce a trading
system within Europe to fulfull the requirements
of Kyoto, indeed is very important for the overall
performance of Kyoto’s system. By contrast, politi-
cal practice suggests that many countries will use
non-trading approaches such as greenhouse-gas
taxes or fixed quantity standards.Hahn and Stavins
show that in these cases, achieving the potential
cost savings of international trading requires some
form of project-by-project credit program – like
joint implementation. However, large transaction
costs, likely government participation, and absence
of a well-functioning market may be obstacles for
this toute. Overall, there is an important trade-off
between the degree of domestic sovereignty and
the degree of cost-effectiveness.
A related question is how to link existing schemes,
for example the Danish and the UK CO2 schemes
(Bode 2002).Again, as long as the abatement costs
in separated trading schemes are different, the
linkage of two schemes can result in increased
overall cost-effectiveness.There will be equity con-
siderations, however, since prices will change com-
pared to the previous equilibrium. This may raise
resistance by the loosing participants in advance of
the linking of schemes. Bode (2002) discusses in
detail how the linkage of schemes and differences
in design features like those discussed in the pre-
sent paper interact with each other. Obviously,
there are also often difficult legal issues involved
(Rodi 2002).
Summary
Tradable permit programs have been in use in the
United States for a long time and are also on their
way to becoming a very popular environmental
policy instrument in Europe. This guide has aimed
to highlight ten of the most important issues in
designing a successful tradable permit program.
1. The choice of trading of emissions versus trad-
ing of inputs (e.g. CO2 trading versus carbon
content trading) depends on the degree to
which the pollutant is uniformly mixed.
2. In most instances, mandatory schemes will be
more cost-effective. They avoid adverse selec-
tion problems in participation.
3. Many arguments speak for the use of absolute
baselines in national programs. We have also
pointed out, however, that the concept of tar-
geting a decline in CO2 emissions intensity in
the economy may have some merit.
4. The clear economic advice is to auction off per-
mits instead of grandfathering them. Of course,
political feasibility considerations will often
make this impossible.
5. Initial allocations may be important for effi-
ciency when there is a high degree of inequali-
ty in wealth between the trading entities, for
example, in the international context.
6. Temporal flexibility should be allowed to as
large extent as environmental effectiveness
allows it.
7. The market management authority needs to be
careful to avoid anti-competitive behavior on
the market, although existing studies seem to
indicate that strategic behavior on tradable
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permit markets is not an important phenome-
non.
8. Participating firms and other entities must have
the ability to quickly communicate in order to
keep transactions costs low.
9. Continual monitoring of compliance and
enforcement of the “rules of the game”of a trad-
able permit program are essential ingredients in
reducing uncertainty for market participants and
to secure environmental effectiveness.
10. The design of national emissions programs in
the presence of international agreements is dif-
ficult. Linking existing schemes inevitably pro-
duces losers who may need to be compensated.
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Table A2:
Conditions affecting cost efficiency and environmental effectiveness
Cost efficiency Environmental effectiveness
Charges Permits Regulation Charges Permits Regulation
Uncertainty about costs – 0 ––0?
Imperfect markets ––? – 0?
Transaction costs 0 – 0000
Imperfect enforcement 0 – ?0 / –– –
Discontinuous control 0 0 ––00
Cost-saving techn. Progress – 0??00
Economic growth 0 0 0 – 0 –
Inflation 0 0 0 – 00
“-” = negative impact; “0” = no impact; “?” = unknown.
Source: Klaassen (1996), Wagner and Schneider (2003).
Table A1:
Instruments of environmental policy and criteria to evaluate them
Instrument Tradeable 
Dimension Emission permits Regulation
Charges
Cost efficiency + + –
Environmental effectiveness – ++
Administrative practicability + + +
Dynamic efficiency + + 0
Political acceptability 0 0/+ +
“+” = high, “–” = low, “0” = neutral.
Source: Klaassen (1996), Wagner and Schneider (2003).CESifo Forum 1/2003 23
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n recent years environmental policy makers
have been paying more attention to tradable
permits (or emissions trading) as an alternative to
the traditional command-and-control (CAC)
approach of setting emission and technology stan-
dards. A notable example is the 1990 U.S. Acid
Rain program that implemented a nationwide mar-
ket for electric utilities’ sulfur dioxide (SO2) emis-
sions (Schmalensee et al., 1998; Ellerman et al.,
2000). In order to have a precise estimate of the
SO2 emissions that are going to the atmosphere,
the Acid Rain program requires each affected elec-
tric utility unit to install costly equipment that can
continuously monitor emissions. Another example
with similar monitoring requirements is the
Southern California RECLAIM program that
implemented separated markets for nitrogen oxide
(NOx) and SO2 emissions from power plants,
refineries and other large stationary sources.1
These and other market experiences suggest that
conventional tradable permits programs are likely
to be implemented in those cases where emissions
can be closely monitored, which almost exclusively
occurs in large stationary sources like electric
power plants and refineries. At least this is consis-
tent with the evidence that environmental authori-
ties continue relying on CAC instruments to regu-
late emissions from smaller sources for which con-
tinuous monitoring is prohibitively costly (or tech-
nically unfeasible). Although CAC regulation for
smaller sources does not directly target emissions
either (the regulated source must install some
required abatement technology or set its emissions
per unit of output equal or lower than a certain
emissions standard),some regulators believe that a
permits program in which emissions are not close-
ly monitored may result in even higher emissions
than under an alternative CAC regulation because
permits provide firms with more flexibility to
choose output and emissions.
Thus, it appears at first that permits markets are
not suitable for effectively reducing air pollution in
cities such as Santiago-Chile or Mexico City where
emissions come from many small (stationary and
mobile) sources rather than a few large stationary
sources. It would be prohibitively costly, for exam-
ple, to require operators of central heating systems
in residential or commercial buildings to install
continuous emission monitoring equipment.
Through annual inspections, however, the regula-
tor could monitor boilers’ combustion technology,
fuel type, emissions rate and size, as he would pre-
cisely do under CAC regulation. But since the reg-
ulator does not observe the total number of hours
boilers are operated during the year, he would cer-
tainly have imperfect estimates of boilers’ actual
emissions.
Rather than disregard tradable permits markets as
a policy tool, I think the challenge faced by policy
makers in cities suffering similar air quality prob-
lems is to find out when and how to implement
these markets using approximate monitoring pro-
cedures similar to those under CAC regulation.
While the literature provides little guidance on
how to approach this challenge, it is interesting to
observe that despite its incomplete information on
each source’s actual emissions, Santiago-Chile’s
environmental agency has already implemented a
tradable permits market to control total suspended
particulate (TSP) emissions from a group of about
600 stationary sources (Montero et al., 2002).
Based on estimates from annual inspection for
technology parameters such as source’s size and
fuel type, the regulator approximates each source’s
* Associate Professor of Economics at the Catholic University of
Chile and Research Associate at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT).
1 It is worth noting that RECLAIM did not include a market for
volatile organic compounds (VOC) in large part because of the dif-
ficulties with monitoring actual emissions from smaller and hetero-
geneous sources (Harrison, 1999).actual emissions by the maximum amount of emis-
sions that the source could potentially emit in a
given year.
Motivated by Santiago’s emissions trading experi-
ment, in a recent paper I provide a theoretical and
empirical evaluation of the advantages of tradable
permits over CAC regulation under imperfect
monitoring (Montero, 2003). The purpose of this
note is to communicate the main results and policy
implications of this study.
Some theory
It is well known that, when emissions can be close-
ly monitored, a tradable permits program can pro-
vide important cost savings over an alternative
CAC regulation (Tietenberg, 1985). It is not clear,
however, whether permits can still provide an
important welfare advantage when emissions are
imperfectly monitored. To answer this question I
develop a theoretical model and I compare social
welfare under the two (optimally designed) poli-
cies: technology (or emission rate) standard and
tradable permits. Since the regulator is assumed to
observe only the firm’s abatement technology or
emission rate but not its actual emissions, in order
to implement the permits policy the regulator must
use some proxy for emissions. For example, as in
Santiago’s trading program, he could proxy emis-
sions by the emissions that the source would emit
if it operated its production facilities without inter-
ruption throughout the year (sources in Santiago’s
program operate, on average, less than half of the
time).2
The theoretical model provides impor-
tant results that can be tested with the
data. In fact, I find that permits policy
provide firms not only with flexibility to
choose production and abatement pos-
sibilities (the cost savings effect) but
sometimes with incentives to choose
socially suboptimal combinations of
output and abatement; something that
would not occur if emissions were accu-
rately measured. The misalignment
between private and social incentives occurs
because the regulator neither observes emissions
nor hours of operation (or output), so the permits
policy can prompt changes in output that can lead
to higher emissions. There are two cases in which
the incentives misalignment can happen.The first
case is when firms with relatively large output ex-
ante (i.e., before the regulation) are choosing low
abatement (i.e., when there is a negative correla-
tion between production and abatement costs).
The second case is when firms doing little abate-
ment find it optimal to increase output ex-post
(i.e., when there is a negative interaction between
output and abatement).
While the cost savings effect is always positive (i.e.,
the permits policy is always cheaper than the stan-
dards policy), the correlation and interaction
effects can be either positive or negative. When
either one or both of these latter two effects are
negative, the superiority of the permits policy over
the standards policy is no longer evident. The size
and sign of these three effects is an empirical mat-
ter that will ultimately depend on the cost struc-
ture of the specific industry (or group of sources)
that is going to be regulated. Generated from sim-
ple but reasonable parameter values, the Figure
provides an illustration of how the correlation and
interaction effects affect the relative advantage of
permits over standards. The permits policy is wel-
fare superior for all those combinations to the right
of line l1.When there are no correlation and inter-
action effects the permits policy is unambiguously
superior to the standards policy.
Because in deciding whether to use permits or
standards, the regulator is likely to face a trade-off
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2 It is important to explain that using as a proxy half of
the maximum emissions would work equally well
because the regulator would then adjust (i.e.,
increase) the number of permits accordingly. See
Montero (2003) for more details.CESifo Forum 1/2003 25
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The model is applied
to emission rates
and utilization
between cost savings and possible higher emis-
sions,it seems relevant to discuss the advantages of
implementing a hybrid policy in which permits are
combined with some (optimally chosen) standard.
While the hybrid policy should not be inferior to
either single instrument policy, I find that in many
situations the hybrid policy converges to the per-
mits-alone policy but it almost never converges to
the standards-alone policy.In fact,for all those cost
structures in which the correlation and interaction
effects fall to the right of line l2 in the Figure, the
hybrid policy converges to the permits-alone poli-
cy, i.e., the inclusion of a binding standard would
decrease welfare.
Some empirical evidence
The theoretical results indicate that whether the
permits policy provides higher welfare than a stan-
dards policy is an empirical question. I use the
experience from Santiago’s total suspended partic-
ulate emissions (TSP) trading program to answer
this question. The TSP trading program, estab-
lished in March of 1992 and effective since 1994,
was designed to curb TSP emissions from the
largest stationary sources in Santiago (industrial
boilers, industrial ovens, and large residential and
commercial heaters). Because sources were too
small to require sophisticated monitoring proce-
dures, the authority did not design the program
based on sources’ actual emissions but on a proxy
variable equal to the maximum emissions that a
source could emit in a given period of time if it
operated without interruption.
The proxy variable (expressed in kg of TSP per
day) used by the authority in this particular pro-
gram was defined as the product of emissions con-
centration (in mg/m3) and flow rate (in m3/hrs) of
the gas exiting the source’s stack. Although the
regulatory authority monitors each affected
source’s concentration and flow rate once a year,
emissions and permits are expressed in daily
terms to be compatible with the daily TSP air
quality standards. Thus, a source that holds one
permit has the right to emit a maximum of 1 kg of
TSP per day indefinitely over the lifetime of the
program.
Sources registered and operating by March 1992
were designated as existing sources and received
grandfathered permits equal to the product of an
emissions rate of 56 mg/m3 and their maximum
flow rate at the moment of registration. New
sources, on the other hand, receive no permits, so
must cover all their emissions with permits bought
from existing sources.The total number of permits
distributed (i.e. the emissions cap) was 64 percent
of aggregate emissions from existing sources prior
to the program. After each annual inspection, the
authority proceeds to reconcile the estimated
quasi-emissions with the number of permits held
by each source (all permits are traded at a 1:1
ratio). Note that although permits are expressed in
daily terms, the monitoring frequency restricts
sources to trade permits only on an annual or per-
manent basis.
Because firms are not required to provide the re-
gulator with information on production and abate-
ment costs, to empirically recover the cost struc-
ture of the industry and test the advantages of the
TSP program I apply the theoretical framework to
information other than cost such as emission rates
and utilization (hours of operation).The Table pre-
sents a summary of the data used in the empirical
study for selected years. The first two rows show
that the exit and entry of sources has been quite
significant. By 1999, 36 percent of the affected
sources were new sources despite the fact that they
did not receive any permits.
In order to comply with the TSP trading program,
affected sources can hold permits, reduce emis-
sions or do both. They can reduce emissions by
either switching fuel (for example, from wood,
coal, or heavy oil to light oil, liquid gas, or natural
gas) or installing end-of-pipe technology such as
filters, electrostatic precipitators, cyclones, and
scrubbers.Sources do not gain anything,in terms of
emissions reduction, by changing their utilization
level (i.e. days and hours of operation), because by
definition it is assumed to be at 100 percent.
The next rows of the Table show data on emission
rates and utilization. The large standard devia-
tions show that these variables vary widely across
sources in all years. As the 1993 numbers indi-
cate,sources’ utilization was quite heterogeneous
before the implementation of the program, indi-
cating some potential for higher emissions under
a permits policy.The Table also indicates that the
emissions rates of affected sources has remained
quite different across sources after the program
became effective. This compliance heterogeneityconfirms that, contrary to what occurs under
CAC regulation where all firms must either
install the same abatement technology or comply
with the same emission rate, permits provide
enough flexibility for sources to comply in very
different ways.
The last two rows of the Table show data on emis-
sions and permits.3 Although 1994 was in principle
the first year of compliance with the program, trad-
ing activity did not occur until the end of 1996
because of evident enforcement problems.The emis-
sions goal of the TSP program was only achieved by
1997 (total emissions below total permits). This was
the year after which natural gas became available
from Argentina at unexpectedly attractive prices so
that many affected sources switched to this cleaner
fuel leaving the cap of 4,087.5 permits largely
unbinding. This is consistent with the fact that all
TSP trading activity took place from the end of 1996
to the middle of 1998 with prices steadily declining
from 17,000 to 3,000 US$/permit.4 For these reasons,
most of the empirical analysis is based on the 1997
data.
Using the data summarized in the Table,I then pro-
ceed to capture the cost structure of the group of
sources affected by the TSP pro-
gram. Econometric estimations
indicate that while the interac-
tion effect is positive (i.e. firms
doing more abatement are also
increasing output relative to
sources doing less abatement),
the correlation effect is negative
(i.e. sources more heavily uti-
lized are doing less abatement).
These two effects almost offset
each other. I find only a mild
increase in emissions, if any,
compared to what would have
been observed under an equiva-
lent standards policy. Further-
more, because cost savings are
found to be substantial (explain-
ed by the significant hetero-
geneity in emission rates shown
in the Table), the permits policy
is found to be superior.
In terms of the Figure, the dot “TSP” provides a good
illustration of the cost structure of the sources affect-
ed by the TSP program, which suggests some poten-
tial gains from implementing a hybrid policy.
Preliminary estimates based on the 1997 data indicate
that the combination of a slightly larger fraction of
permits with an optimally chosen standard could add
some extra 10 percent of benefits.
Conclusions
When emissions cannot be closely monitored, the
environmental regulator will inevitably face a trade-
off between abatement flexibility and output and
abatement misallocation in deciding whether or not
to implement a permits policy instead of a tradition-
al standards policy.Because these misallocations can
lead to higher emissions,I do find situations in which
a standards policy can be welfare superior.However,
when I used emissions and output data from
Santiago’s TSP emissions trading program to test for
this possibility I found no evidence. Conversely, I
found conclusive evidence that the production and
abatement cost characteristics of the sources affect-
ed by the TSP program are such that the permits pol-
icy is unambiguously welfare superior because not
only does it lead to significant cost savings but also
to virtually the same aggregate emissions than under
an equivalent standards policy.




are superior to 
regulation
Summary statistics for affected sources in selected years
Variable 1993 1995 1997 1999
No. of sources
Existing 635 578 430 365
New 45 112 146 208
Total affected 680 690 576 573
Emission rate (mg/m
3)
Average 94.9 83.1 54.7 27.8
Standard dev. 88.1 77.8 43.0 18.5
Max. 702.0 698.2 330.7 108.2
 Min. 1.5 1.5 3.6 4.6
Utilization (%)
Average 39.4 48.0 49.2 53.7
Standard dev. 30.3 31.5 31.8 32.3
Max. 100 100 100 100
Min. 0000
Total emissions (kg/day) 7,051.9 6,320.9 3,535.0 1,665.0
Total permits (kg/day) 4,604.1 4,604.1 4,087.5 4,087.5
Notes: A utilization of 100 percent corresponds to 24 hrs of operation
during 365 days. Utilization figures are based on most but not all sources.
Information on utilization is not required for monitoring and enforce-
ment purposes.
3A few permits were retired from the market in 1997 as the author-
ity revised the eligibility of some sources for receiving permits
(Montero et al., 2002).
4 Obviously, intra-firm trading has continued as new sources are
coming into operation.CESifo Forum 1/2003 27
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The superiority of the permits policy is due in large
part to the fact that sources making larger emission
reductions are also increasing their utilization rel-
ative to other sources. This behavior seems to be
more general than one may think. Firms choosing
abatement investments with proportionally large
fixed/sunk costs (e.g., installing end-of-pipe tech-
nologies) not only make larger reductions but also
enjoy lower ex-post marginal abatement costs (ex-
ante marginal abatement costs should be similar at
the margin), so their ex-post marginal production
cost is relatively lower, and hence, their utilization
relatively higher.5
In conclusion, the theoretical and empirical results
discussed here make a strong case for the wider use
of environmental markets even in those situations
in which emissions are imperfectly observed.In the
particular case of Santiago, these results suggest
that using simple monitoring procedures it is possi-
ble and economically sound to expand the TSP
trading program (which now is responsible for less
than 5 percent of TSP emissions in Santiago) to
other sources that are currently not regulated or
subject to costly CAC regulation such as smaller
stationary sources and industrial processes (both
responsible for 27.0 percent of TSP in 2000),power
diesel buses (36.7 percent), trucks (24.7 percent)
and smaller commercial vehicles and cars (6.8 per-
cent). A similar approach can also be used for re-
gulated other pollutants such as NOx.
References
Ellerman, A.D, P. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, J.-P. Montero and E.M.
Bailey (2000), Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Harrison, David Jr. (1999), “Turning theory into practice for emis-
sions trading in the Los Angeles air basin,” in Steve Sorrell and Jim
Skea (eds), Pollution for Sale: Emissions Trading and Joint
Implementation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Montero, J.-P., J.M. Sánchez, R. Katz (2002),“A market-based envi-
ronmental policy experiment in Chile,” Journal of Law and
Economics 45, 267–287.
Montero, J.-P. (2003), “Trading quasi-emissions permits,” Catholic
University of Chile, mimeo.
Schmalensee,R,P.Joskow,D.Ellerman,J.-P.Montero,and E.Bailey
(1998),“An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 53–68.
Tietenberg,T. (1985), Emissions Trading:An Exercise in Reforming
Pollution Policy, Resources for the Future,Washington, DC.
5 The SO2 trading system of the 1990 US acid rain program pro-
vides strong evidence on this as well. Affected sources retrofitted
with scrubbers (end-of-pipe technologies that can reduce up to
95 percent of the emissions coming out of the stack) experienced a
noticeably increase in utilization relative to affected sources that
switched to lower sulfur coals or simply did not abate emissions
(Ellerman et al., 2000, pp. 334–341).EMISSIONS TRADING WITH
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
JOHANN WACKERBAUER*  
I
n the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 38 developed coun-
tries (plus the EU) accepted legally binding
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions of at least
5 percent over the period 1990 to 2008–12. The
European Union has committed itself to an even
higher reduction of 8 percent within this time
framework. To provide flexibility, the Kyoto
Protocol permits the transfer or exchange of emis-
sions reductions among the signatory countries via
so-called flexible mechanisms. Industrialised coun-
tries may transfer or acquire from each other emis-
sion reductions on a project basis through Joint
Implementation (JI). The Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) allows emissions credits to be
obtained from projects undertaken in developing
countries. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol marks the
creation of an international emissions trading
(IET) system among the signatory states (Galeotti
et al. 2001). Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol
allows a group of countries to have an aggregate
target by setting up a bubble. The countries of the
European Union did this in their burden-sharing
agreement, the EU Bubble being the first of its
kind. Because of this common commitment, emis-
sions trading between the members of the
European Union and between entities within those
countries is regarded as “domestic action“
(Egenhofer 2001).
In March 2000,the European Commission adopted
a Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trad-
ing within the EU and launched a debate on the
introduction of this market-based instrument. In
October 2001, the Commission submitted a pro-
posal for an EU greenhouse gas emissions trading
system. In December 2002, the Council unani-
mously reached political agreement on a common
position on the Commission’s proposal. The pro-
posal covers greenhouse gas emissions trading for
the European Union at industry level which is in
contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, which allows inter-
national emissions trading only at the state level.
According to the EU scheme, the total quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions will be limited and
installations will be able to engage in Community-
wide emissions trading.All installations covered by
the scheme will have to apply for a greenhouse gas
“permit” that requires adequate monitoring and
reporting of emissions. Furthermore, to emit a cer-
tain quantity of greenhouse gases, operators must
possess corresponding greenhouse gas “allow-
ances”, denominated in metric tonnes of carbon
dioxide equivalent. The allowances will be trans-
ferable and may be traded between companies.The
first trading period will be from 2005 to 2007, pre-
ceding the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period.
In this first phase, only CO2 emissions will be cov-
ered by the scheme. The next trading period will
coincide with the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment
period of 2008 to 2012. Member states will allocate
allowances in each trading period such that total
emissions are not higher than if they were regulat-
ed by the IPPC Guideline (EU Commission 2001).
The scheme will be applied to most of the signifi-
cant greenhouse gas emitting activities that are
already covered by the IPPC Directive as well as
some installations not covered (see Table).
According to the Commission, some 4,000 to 5,000
installations will be regulated by the Directive cov-
ering approximately 46 percent of estimated EU
carbon dioxide emissions in 2010. The chemical
sector is excluded because its direct emissions of
carbon dioxide are less than one percent of the
EU’s total emissions, and the number of chemical
installations in the Community, in the order of
34,000 plants, will increase the administrative com-
plexity of the scheme. The waste incineration sec-
tor is excluded due to problems of measuring the
carbon content of the waste material that is being
burnt. However, carbon dioxide emissions from
any on-site power and heat generating facility will
be included if it exceeds the threshold of 20 MW.
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The compatibility of emissions trading with 
traditional environmental instruments
Theoretical considerations suggest that emissions
trading has considerable economic advantages
over the use of other instruments to combat green-
house gas emissions and meet the Kyoto target.
Evidence also suggests that the more widely emis-
sions trading is applied, the higher the economic
benefits. This contrasts with the actual situation of
environmental policy resting on “traditional”
instruments, i.e. regulation, voluntary agreements,
and taxation.
In principle, there are two categories of environmen-
tal policy instruments serving the control of green-
house gas emissions: Direct regulation, also referred
to as command-and-control instruments, on the one
hand, and instruments providing incentives for cli-
mate-friendly behaviour, also referred to as market-
based instruments, on the other. Standards on specif-
ic emissions or energy efficiency are examples of the
first category, taxes and subsidies, but also tradable
permits belong to the second category. With respect
to climate change policy, voluntary agreements and
project-based instruments have to be added to this
list. Voluntary agreements are not easy to classify:
Insofar as they imply a commitment to the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, they resemble a regula-
tory instrument.Insofar as finan-
cial incentives are given to indi-
vidual firms for joining the vol-
untary agreement,they approach
market-based instruments. In
fact, they cannot be clearly
assigned to one of the two cate-
gories but rather resemble a cor-
poratistic approach (Remings et
al. 1996). Last, but not least, pro-
ject-based instruments are new
investments in technical projects
that have environmental advan-
tages. Being voluntary, they can-
not be regarded as command-
and-control instruments;because
of existing incentives for min-
imising the cost of reducing
emissions, they are more or less
market-based.
Economic theory shows that
market-based instruments are
superior to command-and-con-
trol instruments because they minimise the costs of
emission abatement by leaving it up to the plant
operator whether to apply expensive technologies
or to opt for paying fees or buying tradable per-
mits. Technical standards tend to increase costs
because they may impose high expenditures on sin-
gle firms for complying with the regulation.In con-
trast to taxes and subsidies, an emissions trading
scheme provides certainty of the environmental
outcome if a cap is imposed on total emissions.
For a long time, environmental policy has relied on
command-and-control instruments and on subsi-
dies for environmentally friendly behaviour. In
recent years, some countries have introduced
eco(logy)-taxes.Denmark,Norway,Sweden and the
Netherlands introduced CO2 taxes; Belgium,
Finland and Germany imposed additional energy
taxes to encourage emission abatement (Oster-
kamp 2001). Voluntary agreements were part of
pre-Kyoto climate change policy in Finland (energy
conservation agreements), the Netherlands (long-
term energy efficiency agreements), Sweden (eco-
energy programme), France (agreements on CO2
reduction and energy efficiency), Denmark (CO2
emission abatement), the United Kingdom (agree-
ment on energy efficiency improvement) and
Germany (declaration by German Industry on
global warming). Since the Kyoto Protocol (De-
cember 1997), new commitments have been agreed
Activities covered by the Commission’s proposal
Energy activities
   Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW
     (excepted: hazardous or municipal waste installations)
   Mineral oil refineries
   Coke ovens
Production and processing of ferrous metals
   Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering installations
   Installations for the production of pig iron or steele (primary or
secondary fusion) including continuous casting, with a capacity
exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour
Mineral industry
   Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a
production capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime in rotary
kilns with a production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day or in
other furnaces with a production capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day
   Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a
melting capacity exceeding 20 tones per day
   Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in
particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or
porcelain, with a productions capacity exceeding 75 tonnes per day,
and/or with a kiln capacity exceeding 4 m
3 and with a setting density
per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m
3
Other activities
   Industrial plants for the production of
(a)  pulp from timber or other fibrous materials
(b)  paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes
         per day
Source: Commission of the European Communities, COM(2001)581,
Annex 1.in Switzerland (Action Programme Energy 2000)
and in Italy (climate pact between government,
industry and NGOs).The UK introduced a Climate
Change Levy (CCL) that defines a group of volun-
tary commitments as complementary measures and
Germany amended the declaration on global
warming. On the level of the European Union, the
Commission and the automotive industry agreed
on the reduction of specific CO2 emissions of new
cars (Jones et al. 2001).With respect to these mani-
fold instruments adopted for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, including standards,
taxes, voluntary agreements and emissions trading,
attention must be paid to the extent to which they
overlap and whether conflicts between them are to
be expected.
Emissions trading and command-and-control
instruments
The IPPC Directive on integrated pollution and
prevention control1 is the backbone of the regula-
tions regarding stationary pollutants in the
European Union. It requires that installations be
operated in such a way that all appropriate pre-
ventive measures are taken against pollution, in
particular the application of the best available
techniques (BAT) and the efficient use of energy
(Rehbinder and Schmalholz 2002). In principle,
both technology standards and energy efficiency
standards are incompatible with emissions trading
because they do not allow the operator of an
installation to choose between applying the BAT
or buying tradable permits. However, the IPPC
Directive does not yet cover any of the six green-
house gases. Methane (CH4), dinitrogen monoxide
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorinated
hydrocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride
(SF6) are listed as harmful substances in Annex 3
of the IPPC guideline, but there are no emission
standards imposed on them.Carbon dioxide is only
implicitly regulated by the energy efficiency
requirements of the IPPC guideline (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer 2002).
Following the proposal on emissions trading, the
granting of permits for greenhouse gas emissions
will have to be based on the procedures under the
IPPC Directive. But in contrast to other IPPC reg-
ulations, such a permit would only require the
operator to hold a sufficient number of allowances
to cover the installation’s emission in a given peri-
od and not limit its direct emissions of carbon diox-
ide or other greenhouse gases except as they may
have significant local effects. If the IPPC guideline
and corresponding national regulations were mod-
ified such that the principle of preventive action
and requirements on energy efficiency are not
applied to emissions subject to a trading scheme,
existing command-and-control instruments could
be combined with emissions trading.
Emissions trading and voluntary agreements
Industry associations within the European Union
have expressed their strong preference for long-
term voluntary agreements as the prime instru-
ment for the pursuit of climate policy goals. In
most cases,voluntary agreements are based on spe-
cific targets expressed in emissions per output or
energy use per output.At first glance, such relative
industry targets are incompatible with national
absolute targets because growth of industrial pro-
duction can result in an increase of absolute indus-
try emissions even if specific emissions are declin-
ing. This is in contrast with absolute targets
imposed on the European Union and its member
states by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU burden-
sharing agreement (OECD 1998).
However, after the Kyoto Protocol had been
passed,industry interest in using the flexible Kyoto
mechanisms has increased although there are still
only few concrete proposals on how to combine
the Kyoto mechanisms and voluntary commit-
ments. A corresponding approach has been devel-
oped and realised in the United Kingdom (ETG
2000).
The approach of the UK Emissions Trading Group
(ETG) offers a practical answer on how to com-
bine an emissions trading scheme with voluntary
agreements. It distinguishes between a so-called
“absolute“ sector with absolute emission targets
and a “unit“ sector with agreements on specific tar-
gets. In the absolute sector, firms can participate in
the emissions trading scheme voluntarily via the
“direct route“ by accepting an absolute cap on
their carbon dioxide emissions, getting financial
support in return.In the unit sector,firms that have
joined the CCL Agreement take part via the
“agreement route“. In the absolute sector a cap-
and-trade scheme is established while in the unit
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be modified
1 Council Directive 96/389/EC concerning integrated pollution pre-









sector emissions trading is of the baseline-and-
credit type.The former imposes an absolute cap on
a single firm’s emissions that can be freely traded
among the participants of the scheme while the lat-
ter defines a baseline for the specific emissions of
firms that have to buy allowances only if their spe-
cific emissions overshoot the baseline and can sell
allowances only if they over-fulfil their obligations.
The baseline is defined with respect to the indus-
try’s obligation in the voluntary commitment. The
main difference between cap-and-trade and base-
line-and-credit trading is that in the former partic-
ipants hold property rights over all allowances
whereas in the latter property rights are extended
only to the “earned” credits which polluters obtain
by over-achieving the emission reduction targets.
Furthermore, the unit sector may only participate
in national trading whereas companies in the
“absolute” sector may participate in international
emissions trading as well. To prevent allowances
from the unit sector swamping the absolute sector,
the scheme attempts to limit sales from the former
to the latter via a “gateway”.This means that trade
between the “absolute” and the “unit” sector is
unrestricted as long as there is no net flow from the
“unit” to the “absolute” sector. In the reverse case,
the gateway will be closed.
Emissions trading and eco/energy taxes
Both, energy and carbon-dioxide taxes and emis-
sions trading schemes provide incentives to reduce
CO2 emissions.They differ in that price controls fix
the marginal costs of compliance and lead to an
uncertain level of total emissions whereas quantity
controls fix the level of compliance but result in
uncertain marginal costs.With respect to European
and national emission reduction targets, emissions
trading seems to be superior to eco-taxes. In many
European countries climate-change related energy
taxes or CO2 taxes already exist, however, and will
not be abolished in favour of trading schemes. In
consequence, an additional burden would be
placed on companies that are already subject to
environmental taxation if they had to join an emis-
sions trading scheme.To avoid this, a tax reduction
could be given to firms that join the emissions trad-
ing scheme.This is the case in the United Kingdom
where companies signing the climate change agree-
ment and participating in emissions trading obtain
an 80 percent reduction of the climate change levy.
In Germany, energy-intensive industries already
enjoyed an 80 percent reduction of the eco-tax
until the end of 2002. From 2003 on this eco-tax
reduction is only 40 percent. Therefore, an incen-
tive for voluntary participation in the emissions
trading scheme could be given by levying an eco-
tax of only 20 percent on trading firms and of
60 percent on all others.
Concluding remarks
The superiority of the British emissions trading
scheme lies in the clear interaction of already exist-
ing regulatory instruments, voluntary agreements
and carbon taxes, on the one hand, and the new
emissions trading scheme with the coexistence of
absolute and relative reduction targets on the
other. No wonder that the Dutch CO2 Trading
Group proposed the introduction of a similar
scheme in the Netherlands. In this proposal a dis-
tinction is made between an “exposed” sector of
energy-intensive industries faced with internation-
al competition and a “sheltered” sector embracing
all other industries and private households. The
exposed sector, which is subject to a voluntary
commitment to the government, underlies relative
reduction targets deduced from energy-efficiency
standards that are part of the voluntary commit-
ment, whereas an absolute emission target is
imposed on the sheltered sector. In the exposed
sector the initial allocation of emission allowances
is free of charge; in the sheltered sector they are
auctioned annually with the revenues of the auc-
tion being channelled back to the participating
firms and households by means of a reduction of
labour and income taxes and social security premi-
ums.As in the British scheme, trading between the
exposed and sheltered sectors is possible. To pre-
vent an unanticipated increase in emissions from
both the exposed and the sheltered sectors, the
government should be able to adjust the amount of
allowances quickly or to buy the excess supply of
allowances from the market (Kink et al. 2002).
If the Commission’s proposal for a guideline on
emissions trading were modified to a hybrid system
akin to the British and the Dutch models, it would
be easier to integrate already existing national
schemes into the European trading system. For the
first trading period 2005–2007 preceding the Kyoto
commitment period, participation in emissions
trading should be on a voluntary basis and the ini-
tial allocation of allowances should be free. In the
absolute sector, these allowances should be allo-cated according to the requirements of the IPPC
guideline. In the unit sector, allowances for single
firms should be allocated on the basis of output-
related performance standards defined by volun-
tary commitments between the corresponding
industry and the government.Trade in the absolute
sector should be of the cap-and-trade type, and in
the unit sector of the baseline-and-credit type.
Allowance trading between both sectors should be
possible but controlled by a gateway. As an incen-
tive to join the emissions trading scheme, partici-
pating firms should obtain an energy/carbon diox-
ide tax reduction. In addition to allowances result-
ing from emission reductions within the European
Union, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
obtained from CDM projects and Emission
Reduction Units (ERUs) resulting from Joint
Implementation should be introduced in emissions
trading within the EU from the beginning in order
to benefit from cost efficient energy saving pro-
jects abroad.
The political agreement reached by the Council in
December 2002 modifies some issues of the initial
proposal. Although trading will start in 2005, indi-
vidual installations or economic activities can be
exempted from emissions trading in the initial
period 2005–2007 (“opt-out”).Opt-outs are subject
to approval by the Commission, on strict condi-
tions. These notably include fulfilling the same
emission reduction requirements as companies and
installations participating in the scheme, which can
be realised by instruments like voluntary commit-
ments. In addition, member states can unilaterally
include additional sectors and gases from 2008 on
(“opt-in”). The agreement also provides for the
possibility of companies pooling their emission
allocations until 2012 (“pooling”), with a pool
manager acting as representative on the market for
emission allowances. Allocations of emission
allowances will be free of charge, but Member
States can auction off up to 10 percent of
allowances from 2008 (EU Commission 2002).
While these modifications deal with special situa-
tions in certain member countries, the question of
how to combine emissions trading and traditional
environmental policy instruments in an optimal
way still remains unanswered. We therefore urge
the Commission to modify the proposal further by
creating a hybrid emissions trading scheme similar
to the British or Dutch type.
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The EU will allow
opt-outs and opt-ins
as well as pooling